The déjà vu of the Washington Declaration and the September 9 agreement... I hope it's not hasty champagne [Interview file]

Last month, the leaders of the United States and South Korea announced the Washington Declaration, a plan to strengthen extended deterrence against North Korea. The United States and the Republic of Korea will establish the Nuclear Consultative Group to share U.S. nuclear force information and participate in the planning and implementation of the nuclear umbrella. We also decided to regularize the port of call on the Korean Peninsula for strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs), the most powerful strategic asset.

Led by the President's Office, the government and the ruling party attached great significance to the second ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. denials have led to the assessment that it is de facto nuclear sharing. They are clearly excited as if they have the means to drastically control the North Korean nuclear threat.

Five years ago, when the North and the South signed the September 2 military agreement, the atmosphere was similar to now. The North-South agreement to prohibit hostilities on land, sea, and air and to eliminate hazards in the Demilitarized Zone and the West Sea NLL area was met with champagne by the party government as a de facto nonaggression pact.

Both the Washington Declaration and the September 5 military agreement are relative measures. The success or failure depends on how North Korea responds. The September 9 agreement was broken less than five years later due to North Korea's frequent provocations, overshadowed by the hasty cheers of the party government. The Washington Declaration will also be judged as a success in extended deterrence only if North Korea shrinks and lays down its nuclear weapons and missiles. It's not something to be cheered on in advance.

Self-portrait of September, 2018 which was hot

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▲ In 2018, the North and the South signed the 9 September military agreement and took a commemorative photo.

The September 9 military agreement is a form of disarmament, arms control. Prior to the September 19 agreement, historically successful arms control examples were the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Sinai Agreement. CSCE was signed in 9 by 19 countries including Europe, the United States, and Canada, and until the 35s, the scope of advance notification of training and exchanges between military personnel gradually widened. The Sinai Accords also expanded the demilitarized buffer zone with Egypt and Israel expanding it in the first round in 1975 and the second in 1990.

The systems of Europe and the Middle East have been completed by a race of time to build trust step by step and de-escalate the arms race. As such, arms control is not a remarkable document, but the result is a sincere and complete implementation. However, North Korea violated the September 1974 agreement one year after its signature by firing coastal artillery at Changlin Island on November 1, 1975. The Ministry of National Defense explains that drone violations at the end of last year totaled 2 official violations by North Korea.

The North and the South have signed more than 2019 agreements, of which 11 are in the military field, most of which are as good as the September 23 agreement. But every agreement has never been kept. The Moon Jae-in government's self-proclaimed "September 1 agreement is a non-aggression pact" was reckless.

Will North Korea lay down its nukes in the Washington Declaration?

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Extended deterrence is also a policy aimed at specific opponents. The Washington Declaration, the ROK-US enhanced deterrence of North Korea, will succeed only if North Korea is inflated by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and lays down its nuclear program. Had the Washington Declaration been carefully prepared, the United States and South Korea would have precisely simulated how North Korea would act in the face of enhanced extended deterrence.

Therefore, during a background briefing at the Ministry of National Defense on 27 March, a reporter asked the key person in charge of extended deterrence at the Ministry of National Defense, "How do you think North Korea will accept the declaration of the ROK-US leaders?" The official said, "It's hard to say what Kim Jong-un thinks about here." This means that the impact of the enhanced extended deterrence of the United States and South Korea on North Korea has not been pre-verified. It is currently unclear whether North Korea will fold its nuclear program East Sea the Washington Declaration.

Extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella are among the long-standing alliance policies of the United States. Of course, South Korea is also a traditional extension deterrent target of the United States, and the ROK-US expansion deterrence methodology continues to evolve. North Korea knows it well. Yesterday, today, and tomorrow, if North Korea uses nuclear weapons, the United States will also use nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, North Korea holds nuclear weapons and is likely to continue to do so. If North Korea does not lay down its nukes, the full success of the Washington Declaration is hard to come by. Therefore, it is difficult to take at face value the praises emanating from the President's office and party administration, such as "effective extended deterrence over NATO-style nuclear sharing," "SSBN deployment is in effect tactical nuclear redeployment," "de facto nuclear sharing," "greater benefits than self-armament," and "leapfrogging ROK-US nuclear partners."