Turkish opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu has made a big promise to his compatriots: if he is elected president on May 14, Turks will be able to enter the European Union visa-free after three months. In diplomatic circles, this is called "wishful thinking".

Friederike Böge

Political correspondent for Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan based in Ankara.

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For procedural reasons alone, the timetable is illusory. Kilicdaroglu has also made Turkey's membership of the EU his "main goal". In the event of an election victory, he will do his best to achieve a resumption of the accession talks, which have been frozen since 2016.

The presidential candidate has promised far-reaching reforms to restore the rule of law and democracy, as the EU has long demanded. As his first official act, he wants to release the cultural promoter Osman Kavala and the Kurdish top politician Selahattin Demirtas from prison, as required by the European Court of Human Rights.

One thing is certain: a victory for the opposition would initially significantly improve the climate of talks between Brussels and Ankara. The question is: would that be enough to readjust relations? Or would there be a risk of further alienation if the high expectations were not met?

"I think that relations between Turkey and the EU would initially return to a positive agenda, but then we would be confronted with reality quite quickly," says Özgür Ünlühisarcikli, head of the office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Ankara. The most important EU conditions for visa liberalisation would be reforms of anti-terrorism laws and data protection.

According to Ünlühisarcikli's estimates, both could be achieved in three months. "But the Cyprus problem is enough to prevent rapid liberalization." In the conflict with Cyprus, a new president would hardly deviate from the attitude of his predecessor. The same applies to the disputes with Greece over islands and gas deposits in the eastern Mediterranean. Like Erdogan, Kilicdaroglu has previously threatened to "take back" Greek islands in the Aegean Sea.

Points of contention between Russia, Syria and Cyprus

Anyone hoping that new chapters in the frozen EU accession process will soon be opened will be disappointed, says Ünlühisarcikli. The seeds of disillusionment are already there: among opposition politicians, one often hears the view these days that some EU states hoped for an Erdogan victory in order not to be confronted with new visa, accession and refugee issues.

Observers warn that a possible rapprochement would be blocked from the outset if it were reduced to the question of accession talks. Below that, there are many "low-hanging fruits," they say. This includes a resumption of discussion formats that were suspended in 2019 in connection with tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There is a lot to discuss: In terms of its foreign policy positions, Turkey has now moved miles away from the EU. For example, EU sanctions on Russian oil and gas supplies. Turkey has significantly increased energy imports from Russia since the invasion of Ukraine and offered itself as a transshipment point for Russian gas.

Kilicdaroglu has signalled continuity in the event of an election victory. Turkey will only feel bound by UN sanctions. He sees "no reason" to change policy towards Russia. Nor is it expected that a new president would end the Turkish military presence in Syria, which has been criticized by the EU.

Like Erdogan, his challenger probably sees them as necessary to prevent a further influx of refugees and a strengthening of the PKK terrorist group. When it comes to Syria policy, Kilicdaroglu is pushing even harder than Erdogan for a compromise with President Bashar al-Assad. The presidential candidate is linking this to announcements that millions of Syrian refugees will be sent back to the country within two years.

Kilicdaroglu wants to agree to Sweden's accession to NATO

Kilicdaroglu has held out the prospect of normalising relations with NATO in the event of an election victory. He has promised to give his consent to Sweden's accession as soon as possible. However, relations with America are likely to remain complex.

In the dispute over the purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, Kilicdaroglu has not yet taken a clear position. Because of the purchase, the United States has been refusing Turkey since 2019 to deliver F-35 fighter jets that have already been paid for. America's support for Kurdish fighters in Syria would also be a thorn in Kilicdaroglu's side. Anti-Americanism is also no stranger to his Republican People's Party.

A new president would probably differ first and foremost in style and tone from the foreign policy of his predecessor. In a more than 240-page agreement, the opposition alliance has pledged to reupgrade the Foreign Ministry, which was marginalized under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Instead of his personalized, populist foreign policy, the opposition promises more stable, institutionally underpinned relations. Kilicdaroglu's temperament also suggests a more matter-of-fact tone.

Even if President Erdogan is re-elected, a change of course in foreign policy cannot be ruled out. In the course of his twenty-year reign, he proved this several times. Some observers believe that he could present himself as a reconciler and peacemaker in his last term in order to secure his place in the history books.