The impact of the earthquake on Turkish foreign policy

The earthquake that struck southern Turkey is still the most prominent event, and almost the only one, in the country, dominating the political and media scene, leaving its mark on various fields, and is expected to have repercussions on Ankara's foreign policy.

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Throughout history, major natural disasters have had a great impact on the course of countries and civilizations, and may even have sometimes contributed to their emergence and collapse.

Turkey has precedents of this kind, as the 1999 Marmara earthquake - and the state's failure to deal with it - was among the main factors that contributed to the fall of the country's political elite and the voters' search for an alternative, which was represented in the 2002 elections in the (newly established) Justice and Development Party.

There is no doubt that the current Kahramanmaraş earthquake has exceeded in its destructive power and human and urban losses the 1999 earthquake, as Interior Minister Suleiman Soylu announced - until the moment of writing these lines - the death of more than 43 thousand people (compared to approximately 18 thousand in the Marmara earthquake) and the injury of more than 80 alpha.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also spoke about a plan to rebuild about 200,000 buildings, between what was completely destroyed or severely or moderately damaged, rendering it uninhabitable.

On the other hand, nearly half a million people have been evacuated from the region, and the direct and indirect effects of the earthquake have reached more than 15 million people across 11 Turkish provinces, in which about 15% of the country's population lives.

Therefore, it is expected that a catastrophe of this magnitude will have a severe impact in various fields, including foreign policy.

It may be useful, before entering into these variables, to pass through some important data in this regard.

The first of these data is that the internal affairs will be a first priority for the decision-maker in a prominent way.

This was originally expected due to the imminence of the elections, but the earthquake - which Erdogan called the "disaster of the century" - imposed itself on the political discourse and the agenda significantly.

This is because relief and shelter for millions of people, restoring life to the afflicted provinces, running education, health and other services, as well as reconstruction work that requires focus and attention on the one hand, and the allocation of financial, human and administrative resources on the other hand.

On the other hand, this fact is reinforced by the fact that the aforementioned government measures are closely related to the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in terms of their impact on the outcome, which has become more important and sensitive after the earthquake.

Therefore, the government's keenness to complete it in an optimal manner and in the shortest time will be doubly for the same reason.

In addition, the earthquake and its consequences and the measures required by the government will increase the pressure on the economy, which had not yet fully recovered and was further depleted due to the "election economy", that is, the government's spending in many areas and reducing its collections from citizens to ease the financial burdens on them ahead of the elections.

Among the data is the support and sympathy that Ankara obtained from various countries, including countries with which relations prevail with clear hostility, such as Greece, which not only sent a team to participate in the rescue work, but also sent its foreign minister to cooperate and extend a helping hand.

Including also that the works and projects required for the reconstruction and revival of the affected areas and their return to normal life may make Turkey in need of external support.

It is true that the largest estimates of the cost of the earthquake - so far - barely exceed 10% of its national product. However, the exorbitant cost in a short time (in light of Erdogan's promise to complete reconstruction within one year) may push Turkey to seek external support or loans.

Finally, in the hands of discussing the impact of the earthquake on foreign policy, it is important not to forget that Turkey had begun two years ago a path of calm and dialogue with a number of regional parties, and made important strides with some of them, led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, the “Israeli” occupation state, and even Armenia and Greece. .

Foreign Policy

Accordingly, there are general features of the earthquake's repercussions on Turkish foreign policy in the foreseeable future.

The first is the continuation of the truce with the various regional parties, beyond the elections.

Preoccupation with internal affairs will require easing the burdens of foreign policy, especially in cases of tension and escalation.

One of the most prominent examples of this is the tension with Greece that prevailed before the earthquake and was likely to exacerbate further with the approaching elections in the two countries.

While the Greek participation in the rescue work and the visit of its foreign minister was a motive for calming the atmosphere between the two countries, and the step of opening Greek television, broadcasting it with a Turkish song - sympathy for the earthquake victims - had a tangible symbolic dimension, and it was well received in Ankara.

Therefore, despite the approaching elections in the two neighboring countries, it is not expected that tension will return to the relations between them in the near future.

On the other hand, Ankara is likely to continue the policy of balance between Russia and the West as much as possible, as it has done so far, despite the war in Ukraine.

If Western countries can participate in funding or direct support - or even the American F-16 fighter deal - then Moscow has an important role in terms of energy, whether in terms of quantities or prices, which is indispensable, of course.

It is also expected to continue - and then deepen - the path of truce and cooperation with the Arab Gulf states, which can play an important role in financing reconstruction, as well as the importance of their investments in the country and the implications of developing economic and trade relations with them on the Turkish economy in general.

It is assumed that all of this will have repercussions on the roles that Ankara plays in a number of regional files and conflicts towards a more open policy and less confrontation with the regional parties.

In Libya - for example - it is expected that Ankara will have approaches that are more receptive to other local parties and more coordinated with Cairo in particular, especially since this approach is expected from the latter as well.

While the war on terrorism is an exception in this context, in the sense of the continuation of Turkish activities against the PKK in Iraq, for example, its pace and degree can be affected temporarily.

In addition, the ground operation that Ankara has been waving in Syria over the past months is open to a long-term delay, at the very least, due to the damage caused by the earthquake to the border areas with Syria as well as to the Syrian interior, as well as other details related to the military establishment.

Finally, many expect that the earthquake will delay - or hinder - the project to return Syrians residing in Turkey, due to the damage that befell northern Syria.

But this is not at all true, because thousands of Syrians have already left the country for northern Syria after the earthquake, and others are expected to follow suit in light of the need for reconstruction for a long time.

On the other hand, it seems that the houses built by Turkey in northern Syria were not significantly damaged, which may encourage the continuation of the project later, and the earthquake may be a motive for increasing the pace of communication with the regime.

Thus, the earthquake could temporarily hinder the project, but there is no significant impact in the long term.

In conclusion, the devastating earthquake will have its effects on Turkey's foreign policy, consolidating and deepening the de-escalation path that Ankara has pursued in the past two years, focusing on internal affairs, seeking funding and support for reconstruction, and avoiding tension and escalation on several issues, but without prejudice to its priorities. its foreign policy or its national security principles.