By the end of the last long weekend, it became known that Russia had cut off oil supplies to Poland through the famous, Soviet-era Druzhba pipeline.
According to the chief executive officer of the Polish refinery PKN Orlen Daniel Obaitek, and before that it was PKN Orlen who imported about 10% of its oil via pipeline from Russia (after the expiration of the contract with Rosneft, Orlen received oil under a continuing agreement with Tatneft) ), — now, by decision of the Russian side, this flow has also dried up.
And this decision can hardly be called sensational - at least, both the Russian and Polish sides were preparing for it.
I am sure: prepared, and thoroughly enough.
The only question is how much and who will have to pay for this action.
Moreover, the losses of the Russian side here are quite obvious: no matter how competently the logistics are being rebuilt now, you need to be honest at least with yourself - the loss of traditional markets is always quite painful.
It would be foolish, as they say, to deny.
And the Russian "energy" Deputy Prime Minister Novak was forced to announce a reduction in production by half a million barrels per day already in March, not from a good life.
And with an indefinite recovery period.
Here's how it goes.
Another thing is that all these losses, which, by the way, are quite revealing and even, it seems to me, slightly defiantly, no one hides (about the problems with the same, say, the Eastern training ground or shipping insurance, only a very lazy one, probably, did not write) , albeit quite painful - which again is somehow rather stupid to deny - are obviously temporary.
And they are connected just exclusively with the reorientation to new markets and the inevitable alignment of new logistics.
Which, by the way, would sooner or later have to be rebuilt anyway, the deadlines for the tasks set by the economic geography of our country were simply drastically reduced.
In short, very unpleasant, but far from fatal.
Who would not say anything about this very thing in this very West (or on our “liberal-economic flank”).
Our oil production (as well as gas production, as well as energy in general), in general, despite the fact that the tip of Western restrictions was directed specifically at them, is better than others in coping with their relief.
And the reason for this is quite simple: unlike, say, the banking and financial sector, these industries - and not only, by the way, in Russia - are coordinated and controlled by the so-called national regulators.
Therefore, our oilmen are more concerned about relations with OPEC+ partners than relations with “supranational regulators” from Washington.
All other tasks require, of course, time.
And well-known, sometimes not the easiest, efforts.
But they can be solved.
A sort of fare to our common future.
I don’t know how light it will be, but our oil production will certainly have it: energy raw materials and their derivatives have been, are and will remain an acutely scarce commodity everywhere, in any markets where there are claims for economic growth.
And it is no coincidence (and by no means purely out of noble and charitable motives, and even by no means out of a completely understandable sense of solidarity, which the modern Western world has simply forgotten for a long time), the same OPEC + - first of all, of course, OPEC and, so to speak, personally the Kingdom Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on which everything depends there, not only do not increase production by the required half a million barrels per day, but also defiantly raise selling prices for their customers in the Asia-Pacific markets, where our oil industry is now reorienting.
Everything is simple here: in this very “battle for the future”, oil producers, if they want this future for themselves, are forced to play on one side.
For otherwise there is not an illusory chance to lose this very future.
In the European energy markets today the situation is exactly the opposite.
They don't build the future there, they eat it up there.
Moreover, the European economies are conceptually and purposefully trying to restrain the growth of energy prices solely by reducing consumption, a whole grandiose advertising campaign was carried out on this occasion.
And this is not only an obvious decrease in the level and quality of life of the population of European countries, but also the deindustrialization of European economies.
In short, we are here with them, as they say, in antiphase.
And for this, the relatively prosperous (calm down, this is not for long, alas) and still surprisingly comfortable existence of their own, extremely, by the way, parasitic, near-Brussels elites is what the Europeans are paying for - in fact, the economic future of their own countries.
And there is no need to invent anything.
The processes are taking place directly and immediately before our eyes, and, in general, no one is even trying to hide them from anyone.
The simplest example.
As Bloomberg analysts calculated (and, to put it mildly, this is a very benevolent and more than conservative forecast that does not take into account a lot of additional negative factors, but oh well), if everything goes well, then only Germany will need to spend on eliminating the immediate risks of an energy crisis caused by conflict in Ukraine, more than $1 trillion by 2030.
Which, by the way, despite the fact that just to achieve the current goals of stopping the current phase of the crisis, Germany has already simply paid $ 275 billion in fact (and this is the eurozone, thanks to the warm winter, did not face the worst scenario), it is hard to believe, sorry.
Therefore, we emphasize that this is a very benevolent and very conservative forecast.
Not taking into account, for example, the inevitable collapse of a very serious share of the industrial production of the European subcontinent, even at the current, very benign, level of energy prices.
Well, and other “accompanying nonsense”: how much, for example, a sharp and inevitable increase in unemployment among the previously most qualified and confident part of the population will cost Europe and how much the accompanying increase in social tension will cost, of course, Bloomberg did not consider.
So the price of the issue we have with the Europeans, including the decision on oil supplies to Poland, at least in current trends, is quite different.
But even this is not the main thing: we, at least, are now paying for ourselves a ticket, perhaps not to the simplest, but objectively existing future.
From the point of view of even a medium-term historical perspective, they are paying for themselves a ticket to nowhere.
The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.