Whether it's the rise in prices, the delayed energy transition or dependence on Russia: Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, energy policy has been discussed almost daily. But how did Germany get into this situation in the first place? Were today's problems predictable? And what conclusions should be drawn from the mistakes of the past?

Felix Schwarz

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Economist Claudia Kemfert explores all these questions in her book "Shockwaves". As Professor of Energy Economics and Sustainability at Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Head of the Department of Energy, Transport and Environment at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) and member of the German Advisory Council on the Environment, she is one of Germany's best-known energy and climate researchers.

Not everyone likes your involvement with the "Scientists For Future" and some sharp, pointed formulations. A small sample: "How the fossil fuel mafia managed to infiltrate the state and the economy and delay the energy transition," she suggested on Twitter as an alternative book caption.

Science with green activism?

Some critics accuse her of mixing science with green activism. Kemfert knows how to present her theses in a concise, generally understandable and personal way. She describes extensively her numerous discussions with politicians, scientific colleagues and entrepreneurs.

Their disappointments, their desperation and their ever-burgeoning motivation to want to enlighten become clear. Kemfert complains about the one-sided understanding of energy security. After all, energy security should never be considered in isolation, but should always be thought of in conjunction with social justice and climate protection.

Ever since Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik ("Change through Trade"), she has seen a growing naivety in German politics when it comes to partnership with Russia.

Baltic Sea pipelines as big mistakes

However, Kemfert sees the root of the problem in the cooperation of German companies such as Eon and BASF with the Russian state-owned company Gazprom and the construction of the Baltic Sea pipelines Nordstream 1 and 2. Even then, it became apparent that Russia sees the construction of new natural gas pipelines as part of its foreign and security policy strategy.

Similar to the first Nordstream 1 project, Kemfert considers the construction of the Nordstream 2 pipeline to be a big mistake, and not just in retrospect. Even then, it was clear that if Russia were to stop deliveries, there would be a lack of pipeline systems to supply Eastern European countries with alternatives. And the sale of gas storage facilities to Russia also increased dependence.

Kemfert also considers the fact that the federal government did not introduce an obligation for a gas reserve at the time to be a major omission. She is shocked by the ignorance of Merkel, Steinmeier and Gabriel. Ignorance of the warnings of science, Eastern European partners, the EU Commission and the USA.

LNG terminals still useful 15 years ago?

In addition, all the fatal partnerships and business relations between Germany and Russia would not have been able to ignite this force in the Ukraine war without the delayed energy transition. The fact that Kemfert once promoted nuclear power and LNG terminals is described by some critics as agility. She herself is trying to resolve this contradiction.

Nuclear power would have been an option for Kemfert 15 years ago – provided that politicians had phased out coal-fired power more quickly and had expanded renewable energies more courageously. Due to their decades-long service life, LNG terminals would also have been worthwhile from their point of view at the time.

There is a rarity on this topic: criticism of the Greens. Albeit without mentioning his name. This is because Federal Minister of Economics Robert Habeck had several LNG terminals built, also in order to be able to import green hydrogen in the future.

The tone of a head teacher

Apart from that, Kemfert sometimes emphasizes again and again, in the manner of a senior teacher, that the Greens (and of course she herself) knew better. Which is probably true with regard to Russia and the relevance of the energy transition.

She accuses Angela Merkel and Sigmar Gabriel of having had no interest in a rapid phase-out of fossil fuels. And the billions of dollars in subsidies for nuclear, gas and coal have been swept under the table. What's more, a network of lobbyists and pseudo-scientists has initiated a disinformation campaign against the energy transition.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is also taking them to task. According to Kemfert, an energy embargo could have brought about an earlier end to the war. Therefore, she is very bothered by Olaf Scholz's criticism of economists' scientific model calculations, which suggested that Germany could have coped with an energy embargo.

Even if she sometimes mistakes her tone (the "people" feel betrayed by misleading communication from the government), Kemfert excels in pointing out the mistakes of German politics and business in a gripping narrative style. The delayed energy transition and the naivety towards Putin will go down in German history as a fall from grace.